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ABSTRACT: This paper shows how the availability heuristic can be used to justify 
inference to the best explanation in such a way that van Fraassen's infamous "best of a bad 
lot" objection can be adroitly avoided. With this end in mind, a dynamic and contextual 
version of the erotetic model of explanation sufficient to ground this response is presented 
and defended. 
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1. Introduction 
The programs respectively associated with bounded and ecological rationality 
(BER) and the heuristics and biases program (HBP) have been regarded as having 
significant implications for many areas of philosophy and psychology. The HBP is 
an empirically motivated project that focuses on demonstrating why human 
cognitive performance with respect to tasks like probabilistic reasoning and 
decision-making often violates (or appears to violate) classical norms of 
rationality.1 On a more positive note, those working in the context of this program 
have argued that human cognitive performance involves using variety of simple 
heuristics rather than conformity to the classical norms of rationality (i.e. the 
probability calculus, classical first-order logic, orthodox decision theory, etc.). The 
BER project is also an empirically minded project aimed at showing that human 
cognitive performance is actually rational despite the fact that such behavior often 
does not satisfy classical standards of rationality. BER specifically focuses on the 
                                                        
1 See Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Tool Box 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Also, see Ken Manktelow, Thinking and Reasoning 
(New York: Psychology Press, 2012) for an excellent overview and Johnathan Howard, Cognitive 
Errors and Diagnostic Mistakes (New York: Springer, 2019) for discussion of heuristics and 
cognitive biases in medicine. 
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computational and environmental features of real cognitive performance as the key 
to understanding how humans are rational in terms of this alternative, heuristic-
based and environmentally sensitive, account of rationality.  
BER is a reaction to the pessimistic interpretation of the results of the HBP 
which were sometimes alleged to show that humans are badly irrational when 
judged against classical norms of rationality.2 The defenders of the BER project 
effectively disputed this more pessimistic conclusion and argued that facts about 
human cognitive performance are better understood as evidence that the 
traditional norms of rationality are not the correct norms by which human 
cognitive performance should be judged. The opposition between these two camps 
is ongoing and it has led to some heated exchanges.3 But, these ideas can be usefully 
combined to support an alternative and empirically grounded conception of 
rationality as adherence to heuristic rules that are normatively appropriate in 
certain ecological contexts and given human cognitive limitations.4  
In this paper this sort of empirically based and fallibilistic approach to 
rationality is used to justify inference to the best explanation (IBE) and this 
justification is specifically based on the availability heuristic. This strategy also 
involves the central contention that IBE involves the more general notion of 
problem or question substitution.5 In its relevant form, the availability heuristic is 
the claim that certain inferences and decisions are made on the basis of 
psychologically familiar factors, as opposed to all relevant factors.6 Problem or 
question substitution is just the tactic of substituting and solving an easier version 
of a problem when a given problem is itself too difficult to solve. So, the 
availability heuristic is just a special case of problem substitution.7 The contention 
here then is that it is rational to accept the best psychologically available 
                                                        
2 See Richard Nisbett and Eugene Borgida, “Attribution and the Psychology of Prediction,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (1975): 932-43 and Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, 
Inevitable Illusions (New York: John Wiley, 1994). 
3 See Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, and Michael Bishop, “Ending the Rationality Wars: How 
to Make Disputes about Human Rationality Disappear,” in Common Sense, Reasoning and 
Rationality, ed. Renee Elio (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 236-268, Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky, “On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions: A Reply to Gigerenzer’s Critique,” 
Psychological Review 103 (1996): 582-591 and Gerd Gigerenzer, “On Narrow Norms and Vague 
Heuristics,” Psychological Review 103 (1996): 592-596.. 
4 A version of this hybrid view antedates both HBP and BER and was defended in Herbert 
Simon, Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1957). 
5 See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Ferrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 
6 See Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow. 
7 See Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, ch. 9 for discussion of this connection. 
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explanation of psychologically available data when we frame this sort of inferential 
practice in terms of a more naturalistic and realistic conception of rationality. In 
other words, it is often perfectly rational to substitute simpler explanatory 
problems for more complex ones. This is due to our cognitive limitations and 
environmental constraints. Such substitution does carry with it the possibility of 
cognitive bias and error, but this is no surprise when we recognize that explanatory 
reasoning involves uncertainty and limited cognitive resources. However, as we 
shall see, such reasoning also involves the possibility for the correction of such 
errors and the refinement of our explanatory understanding. 
The model proposed here for IBE is founded on a theory that combines 
insights from epistemic contextualism and the erotetic theory of explanation. One 
important implication of this work is that it provides an answer to van Fraassen’s 
infamous criticism of IBE.8 This critical attack on IBE is based on the contention 
that the conclusions of such inferences should not be taken to be likely (and hence 
should not be accepted). This is supposed to be because such inferences are always 
based on a set of available hypotheses that constitutes only a small sub-set of all of 
the possible hypotheses that are potential explanations of a given phenomenon. So, 
as van Fraassen has argued, it appears to be the case that it will always be much 
more likely that the true explanation is among the set of unconsidered (and mostly 
unformulated) hypotheses. The alternative model of IBE presented in this paper 
neatly avoids this criticism and renders rational the acceptance of the conclusions 
of such inferences. In part this is because the model of IBE introduced here is both 
dynamic and contextual thus providing for the possibility of error correction and it 
is based on the insight that contextual factors fix the sets of hypotheses and 
evidence that are appealed to in such inferences.9  
                                                        
8 See Bas van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). 
9 The theory developed here has much in common with Hintikka’s view of abduction as the 
search for correct explanations (i.e. as abductive search) as presented in Jaakko Hintikka, “What 
is Abduction? The Fundamental Problem of Contemporary Epistemology,” Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society 34 (1998): 503-533. He concludes that abduction is not a form of 
inference at all. The view defended here is that IBE is the terminal step in abductive search and 
that IBE is indeed a form of inference involved in that process. But, abductive search also 
involves seeking evidence and constructing sets of theories that are used as inputs in IBEs. In 
other words, abductive search includes the construction of the sample space of theories and the 
marshalling of relevant evidence, which are then employed in IBE inferences. This aligns with 
much of Jonah Schupbach’s criticism of van Fraassen’s objection to IBE from “Is the Bad Lot 
Objection Just Misguided?” Erkenntnis 79 (2014): 55-64. Schupbach argues that van Fraassen’s 
criticism of IBE is misguided in that it confuses the issue of the probity of IBE inferences with 
the matter of the completeness and appropriateness of the input into IBE inferences. See Kyle 
Stanford, Exceeding our Grasp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and Finnur Dellsén, 
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2. Constructing a theory of IBE 
IBE is perhaps the most basic form of reasoning that humans engage in. Perhaps 
more crucially, IBE plays a central role in scientific inquiry. For example, 
McMullin and Lipton contend that it is the central form of inference in science.10 
But, there has been much critical discussion of this sort of explanatory reasoning 
and considerations of the probity of explanatory reasoning as a distinct form of 
inference are most notably traceable back to Peirce’s work on abduction.11 On this 
basis, it should be clear that any suitable account of IBE must satisfy (at least) three 
important desiderata. First, the account must incorporate a plausible theory of 
explanation. It is straightforwardly obvious that we must know what an 
explanation simpliciter is if we are to hope to come to know what the best 
explanation of anything is. Second, the account must provide an explication of 
what it is for one explanation to be better than another explanation. Finally, the 
probative nature of this form of inference must be accounted for. This last aspect of 
any adequate account of IBE is especially important, as IBE arguments must 
provide warrant for their conclusions in such a way that we are entitled to 
provisionally accept such theoretical claims.12 If this final desideratum is not 
satisfied, then it is obvious that IBE would be of no use in solving the problem of 
the acceptance of theoretical claims in a substantial and normative sense.  
2.1 The Questions of Explanation 
The 20th century history of the philosophy of science is replete with examples of 
attempts to provide adequate theories of explanation, and this fact is well-
represented and summarized in Salmon’s classic 1989 survey.13 The most well-
                                                                                                                      
“Reactionary Responses to the Bad Lot Objection,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
Part A 61 (2017): 32-40 on this issue and others related to the bad lot objection. 
10 See Ernan McMullin, The Inference that Makes Science (Marquette: Marquette University 
Press, 1992) and Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 
2004). 
11 See C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul 
Weiss, and Arthur Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, c.1901/1931-1958). 
12 This is the general gist of van Fraassen’s Laws and Symmetry criticism of IBE. See Samir 
Okasha, “Van Fraassen’s Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation,” Studies in the History 
and Philosophy of Science 31 (2000): 691-710, Stathis Psillos, “On Van Fraassen’s Critique of 
Abductive Reasoning,” The Philosophical Quarterly 46 1996): 31-47, Stathis Psillos, Scientific 
Realism: How Science Tracks the Truth (London: Routledge Press, 1999), Timothy Day and 
Harold Kincaid, “Putting Inference to the Best Explanation in Its Place,” Synthese 98 (1994): 
271-295 and Stanford 2010 for extensive discussion of van Fraassen’s argument. 
13 See Wesley Salmon, “Four Decades of Scientific Explanation,” in Phillip Kitcher and Wesley 
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known theory of course is the deductive-nomological model of explanation. 
However, there are numerous well-known counter-examples to this account of 
explanation, and, for the most part, this theory has been rejected.14 But, this need 
not worry us as there is a readily available alternative account of explanation that 
can be used to ground IBE. This model takes an explanation to be the answer to an 
explanatory question. As such, the best explanation will turn out to be the best 
answer to such a question. This account of explanation is promising because it ties 
explanation directly to understanding without begging any specific questions about 
what types of explanations are legitimate. In point of fact, it is compatible with the 
view that different kinds of explanations are perfectly legitimate in different 
contexts within a particular discipline, or in different disciplines, or at different 
times, etc. As such, it is perfectly compatible with the idea that methodological 
standards can vary with context. As we shall see this is a significant virtue of the 
account of IBE presented here. The modern work on erotetic logic that gave rise to 
the general idea of an erotetic model of explanation can be traced back to the work 
of Åqvist via the more or less independent work of Belnap and Steel, Hintikka, and 
Bromberger.15 But, the best-known and more contemporary erotetic accounts of 
explanation are those presented by van Fraassen and Tuomela.16 However the 
                                                                                                                      
Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 3-219 
and Wesley Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984).  
14 See Phillip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon, eds., Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989) and Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980) 
for detailed consideration of the problems with the D-N model of explanation. This is not to say, 
of course, that other accounts of the nature of explanation are not also problematic. For example, 
as shown in Michael Shaffer, “Unification and the Myth of Purely Reductive Understanding,” 
Organon F (forthcoming), the unificationist view of explanation is also afflicted with serious 
problems related to IBE. The unificationist view is most famously defended in Phillip Kitcher, 
“Explanatory Unification,” Philosophy of Science 48 (1981): 507-531, Phillip Kitcher, The 
Advancement of Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Michael Friedman, 
“Explanation and Understanding,” The Journal of Philosophy, 71 (1974): 5-19. 
15 See Lennart Åqvist, A New Approach to the Logical Theory of Interrogatives, Part 1: Analysis 
(Uppsala: Filosofiska föreningen i Uppsala, 1965), Noel Belnap and Thomas Steel, The Logic of 
Questions and Answers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), Jaakko Hintikka, The 
Semantics of Questions and the Questions of Semantics (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1976), 
Sylvain Bromberger, On What we Know we Don’t Know (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992) and Sylvain Bromberger, “Why Questions,” in Robert Colodny (ed.) Mind and Cosmos: 
Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, vol. 3 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1966,: 75-100.  
16 See van Fraassen, The Scientific Image and Raimo Tuomela, “Truth and Best Explanation,” 
Erkenntnis 22 (1985): 271-299. 
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theory of IBE developed here will be more specifically based on Hintikka’s account 
of the logic of questions and answers, though the account presented is ultimately 
also rather like that proposed by Tuomela.17 However, before turning to the 
relevant details of that account it will be instructive to first outline some of the 
characteristic and general features of the erotetic model of explanation. 
2.2 The Multiplicity of Explanation and Context 
It has been widely acknowledged for quite some time now that a given body of 
data can be explained by a potentially infinite number of theories. This is just the 
familiar point about the underdetermination of theory by evidence. However, 
there is another sort of ambiguity inherent in the activity of explanation that is 
accentuated in the erotetic model of explanation. This is the following sort of 
pedagogical phenomenon. Even mild acquaintance with science and how it is 
generally taught should make us aware of the kind of situation in which an 
explanation of some phenomenon is presented, where that explanation is later 
revealed to be incomplete or not quite correct. For example, classical mechanics is 
generally taught before quantum mechanics or relativistic mechanics, and, 
typically the latter types of explanation of the very same phenomena are regarded 
as more complete and more correct. However, in general, this does not impugn the 
simpler explanation either as worthless or as non-explanatory. Quite the opposite 
is true in practice. The explanation of many phenomena in terms of classical 
mechanics is often retained because it is appropriate in certain contexts. This issue 
raises an aspect of explanation that has not received as much attention as it 
deserves from philosophers of science. This is just the context dependence of 
explanation.18 It is however helpful for the purposes of this paper that sensitivity to 
context dependence has become commonplace in contemporary epistemology, and 
this provides us with some guidance on the matter. 
The sense in which explanation appears to be context dependent is then 
relevantly similar to the sense in which the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘justification’ 
have been said to be context dependent in relatively recent discussions in 
epistemology. Specifically, Keith DeRose and David Lewis have famously defended 
this sort of view.19 The basic idea behind the concept of context dependence of 
                                                        
17 Gilbert Harman, “Inference to the Best Explanation,” The Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 88-
95, and Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. 
18 Ironically, the theory presented in Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980) incorporates the contextual aspects of explanation most straightforwardly. 
19 See Keith DeRose, “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense,” in John Greco and Ernest 
Sosa (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Malden: Blackwell, 1999), 187-205.  
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epistemological concepts like knowledge is that assumptions about the epistemic 
standards involved in a given situation vary from context to context and so our 
attributions of knowledge may also vary as a result. For example, in everyday 
discussion skeptical hypotheses are ignored as irrelevant while in the context of a 
philosophical discussion about the nature of knowledge skeptical hypotheses are 
taken to be relevant. As such, one may have the knowledge that there is a hand 
before one’s face in the former context, but not in the latter context without 
contradiction. This is supposed to be the case because the standards that govern the 
philosophical context are much stronger than those that are in place in more 
ordinary, everyday, contexts. This then is the crux of the contextualist view of 
knowledge. Whether a particular person knows a particular proposition depends 
on certain contextual features of the person’s epistemic situation. 
What will be suggested here is that explanation has a similar sort of context 
dependence that has gone largely unnoticed by most philosophers of science. For 
example, what counts as an acceptable explanation of a phenomenon in a high 
school physics class is different from what counts as an acceptable explanation of 
that phenomenon in a graduate level physics seminar, and our theory of 
explanation needs to reflect this fact about scientific practice. The epistemic 
standards that are presupposed in the latter context are much more stringent than 
those at work in the former, and that makes an important difference with respect 
to which theory we ought to accept in a given context. The main feature of the 
view defended here is that context determines what kinds of explanatory standards 
are in place in a context, the body of explanatory hypotheses to be considered and 
the body of evidence to be explained. Different degrees or depths of 
explanatoriness are then appropriate to different contexts much like different 
standards of evidence apply in different contexts according to epistemic 
contextualism about knowledge.  
In terms specific to the erotetic model of explanation, this will amount to 
regarding the best explanation as the best answer to some why-question or how-
question given some specified explanatory context. Of course this means that we 
will have to say something about what contextual factors need to be taken into 
account in general when assessing what explanation is best in a fully specified 
explanatory context. However, as epistemic context appears to be highly plastic 
and variable, it may turn out that there is not very much of interest that we can say 
about general epistemic standards across contexts. So, one interesting aspect of the 
                                                                                                                      
Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism and Context, Volume I. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549-567. 
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theory of explanation presented here will concern the extent to which we can 
claim that there are any non-contextual methodological standards that all 
explanations must meet. The specific view defended here is that there are some 
such invariant standards, but they are rather weak. This acknowledgement of the 
relative plasticity of explanatory contexts then in turn helps to explain the variety 
of explanatory practices of practitioners in different disciplines, the variety of 
explanatory practices at different times in the same discipline, etc.  
One might be immediately tempted to object to this general account of 
explanation due to the perceived relativity that it imposes on the concept of 
explanation, and there are at least prima facie reasons to be sympathetic to this 
initial reaction. However even though such worries appear cogent it will be argued 
here that they are ultimately not serious worries. For the most part, this sort of 
worry is the result of baggage left over from previous accounts of explanation. 
Going back to Hempel’s classic work on explanation, ‘explanation’ has generally 
been taken to be a success term and one of the chief desiderata of an adequate 
explanation is that it be true. So, for example, as explanation is traditionally 
understood, the Ising model of magnetism in solids cannot explain anything 
because the Ising model of magnetism is, strictly speaking, false. Given this long-
standing desideratum of theories explanation it might appear that the theory of 
explanation sketched above will be unacceptable as it would seemingly appear to 
allow both that false theoretical claims can be explanations provided the correct 
context is present. But this problem is really a non-issue. 
This is because what does not vary is whether or not a particular theoretical 
claim is a potential explanation of a phenomenon. Whether a particular theoretical 
claim is, or is not, a potential answer to a given scientific question is purely a 
matter of erotetic logic. There may be an infinite number of such answers that can 
be formulated with respect to any scientific question, but this does not in any way 
entail relativism of any sort in and of itself. Again, on the view developed here 
what most importantly varies with context are the epistemic standards by which 
we judge the superiority of explanations relative to one another. This involves the 
acceptability of the epistemic standards in question. Should the same context arise 
on more than one occasion, then the same evaluative ranking in terms of ‘bestness’ 
of explanation should result provided we are considering the same set of 
theoretical claims with respect to the same body of evidence and background 
knowledge. As such, substantive worries about the relativity of explanation seem 
largely unfounded. Such relativity as there is in this account is simply a function of 
the fact that the epistemic standards for acceptance of theoretical claims can vary 
across epistemic situation types. But, what it really indicates is just that 
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explanitoriness comes in degrees and that evidential standards can vary and 
nothing more radical than that.20  
In line with this, it is well-known that IBE is a form of nonmonotonic 
inference.21 For nonmonotonic inferences of this sort then a given theoretical 
claim Ti might be the best explanation of a body of evidence e in context Bk, while 
Tj might be the best explanation of e & f in Bk or of e in Bl.22 It is in this sense that 
inference to the best explanation is then a kind of ampliative and defeasible 
inference, and it seems as if we might be able to represent this property of IBE 
while at the same time allowing for a sense in which it is probative. So, we need 
then to determine how to represent such inferences and when we can regard 
instances of IBE as “good” in a clear sense. But first there are some important other 
factors concerning IBE that need to be examined. First and foremost, in these sorts 
of inferences we typically restrict our attention only to some factors that make up a 
relatively well-defined inferential context. In these restricted contexts evidence is 
typically limited to some sub-set of the total known evidence e, where we limit the 
set of theoretical claims considered to a sub set of Tthe set of all competing 
theoretical claims with respect to some phenomenon, and/or where we fix other 
particular methodological features that govern inferences. If information is added 
to our premises or contextual factors change, then what inferences are considered 
to be warranted can also change. As a result, this version of IBE reflects the 
defeasibility of IBE and this account of IBE squares well with the fact that, in 
actual practice, scientists accept theories but never make such inferences from 
complete bodies of evidence or from exhaustive sets of theoretical claims. This is 
primarily because of cognitive and computational limitations.  
2.3 IBE 
Preliminaries aside, we can then introduce this account of IBE. An explanatory 
scientific problem Si will be taken to be a quintuple consisting of one or more why- 
or how-questions Qn, a set of all competing theoretical claims T indexed to elements 
of Qn that minimally fulfill a set of logical criteria EXP for what counts as an 
answer to a given question qi, where qi  Qn, the total body of relevant evidence E 
and a context B. So, the i-th ideal explanatory scientific problem will be written as 
Si = <Qn, T, E, B, EXP>. However, as most scientific problems are complex there 
                                                        
20 See Peter Railton, “Probability, Explanation, and Information,” Synthese 48 (1981): 233-256. 
21 See Gerhard Brewka, Jurgen Dix, and Kurt Konolige, Nonmonotonic Reasoning: An Overview 
(Stanford: CSLI, 1997) and Henry Kyburg and Choh Man Teng, Uncertain Inference (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
22 See Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed., 92. 
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will be several members of Qn, but in the simplest casewhat we will call a simple 
problemQn will be a singleton and qi = Qn. Where Si is complex there will be an 
appropriate number of T indexed to the elements of Qn, and B will be similarly 
indexed. The solution to a given simple explanatory scientific problema given Si 
where Qn is a singletonis then Ti, the element of T which satisfies EXP and fares 
best in terms of E and the various standards encoded in B. More realistic and 
contextually restricted explanatory scientific problems will involve restrictions of 
T and of E. In a given context Bi a research group trying to answer a given 
explanatory question qi may limit consideration to Tna few select members of T 
such that Tn  T or they may limit consideration to some sub-set eK of the total 
relevant known evidence EK. For example, one crucially important way that T is 
restricted by B is via the introduction of idealizing assumptions.23 In such cases, 
when a given idealizing assumption I is imposed in a given context it effectively 
rules out of consideration all theoretical claims that fail to hold under I. In other 
words doing so restricts consideration to I-simplified theories. Other ways of 
limiting T are common and include restricting consideration to extant theories, or 
restricting consideration to highly plausible theories, or simple differential 
comparisons of just two competitors, etc. So, one example of a more realistic 
construal of the i-th simple explanatory scientific problem can be written as Si = 
<qi, Tn, eK, B, EXP>. Typically this reflects the fact that real scientific research 
concerning a simple explanatory problem involves a finite set of theories and some 
sub-set of the known relevant evidence in a fixed context that determines which 
methodological standards will be used to evaluate the competing theories. It is here 
that the work on bounded and ecological rationality will ultimately play an 
important role in understanding the probative nature of this complex form of 
inference. However, let us turn our attention at this point to saying a bit more 
about questions and their role in scientific explanation. 
Following Åqvist and Hintikka, the sorts of questions we are interested in 
can be analyzed in terms of epistemic imperatives to bring about certain epistemic 
states.24 So, we can analyze questions as requests by an agent to some external 
source of information to bring it about that the agent knows the answer. All well-
formed questions of these sorts implicitly incorporate the presupposition of that 
question. The question ‘Is ϕ the case?’ presupposes that ϕ is the case or that it is not 
the case that ϕ, and the question ‘Why is ϕ the case?’ presupposes that ϕ is the 
                                                        
23 See Michael Shaffer, Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 
2012). 
24 See Åqvist, A New Approach to the Logical Theory of Interrogatives, Part 1 and Hintikka, The 
Semantics of Questions and the Questions of Semantics. 
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case. A question admits of satisfactory answers only if the presupposition of that 
question is true, or at least approximately true. In general we will indicate the 
presupposition of a given question with an expression of the form PR(qi). 
Minimally acceptable answers to questions are then propositions that allow us to 
understand the presupposition of that question to some degree. So, a minimally 
acceptable answeror a potential answerto a given simple scientific problem is a 
theoretical claim that at least in part explains the presuppositions of a given 
scientific problem. Acceptable answers to specifically scientific problems are 
theoretical claims that allow us to understand a phenomena or the law that the 
question is about.  
This view then naturally looks very much like an erotetic approach to 
Peircean abductive/explanatory inference. However, Hintikka criticized the 
common view that abduction is a distinct and bona fide form of inference at all.25 
Against this common view Hintikka suggested that abduction is really a search 
strategy in the epistemic attempt to discover truth, as opposed to a form of 
inference. As Hintikka ultimately saw it, abductive search is the search for true 
answers to why-questions and why-questions are simply requests for explanations. 
So, according to Hintikka, abductive search is eroteticit is a form of explanatory 
inquirybut there is no such thing as abductive inference per se. The view 
defended here is, to a significant degree, in agreement Hintikka’s. As it will be 
understood here, abductive search is the dynamic process of searching for 
explanatory answers to why-questions. But, the contention made here is that IBE is 
the terminal and inferential stage of abductive search. So, the position defended 
here is that abduction is not precisely the same thing as IBE. However, against 
Hintikka in particular, the view defended here is that inference to the best 
explanation is a form of inference employed in the broader process of abductive 
search, even if abductive search itself is not a form of inference. In any case, the 
attempt to construe how the members of T are demarcated with respect to some 
problem Si requires that we address explicitly what constitutes EXP, the set of 
logical requirements that a given theoretical claim must fulfill in order to be 
considered a member of T in the context of some scientific problem. 
2.4 Potential Explanations 
We can now turn our attention to satisfying one of the three desiderata for an 
account of IBE mentioned earlier. Specifically, we can address what it is for one 
claim to be explanatory with respect to another. As this conceptual issue does not 
                                                        
25 See Hintikka, “What is Abduction.” 
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incorporate any evaluative or comparative elements the minimal requirements for 
membership in the set of potential answers to a given scientific problem are 
neither especially strong nor especially interesting. In point of fact, it will be 
suggested here that in an ideal world where there were no computational or 
physical limitations on scientific practitioners, the evaluation of which explanation 
is best with respect to a scientific problem would be purely a matter of logic, 
probability and statistics in the more formal sense. However, as has been stressed 
in earlier sections of this paper we do not live in such a world, and so we are often 
forced to simplify things by limiting our concern to those relevant theoretical 
claims that have been formulated and which satisfy certain additional contextual 
constraints, and to the relevant evidence of which we are aware. In any case we 
can now turn to discussion of the minimal criterion that a theoretical claim must 
satisfy in order to be included in the set of potential answers to a given explanatory 
scientific problem. As we saw earlier, for a given answer to an explanatory 
scientific problem to be counted as an explanation it must satisfy the basic 
principle EXP. EXP is then understood here as follows: 
(EXP) With respect to background knowledge B and where Tj  B and PR(qi)  E, 
theoretical claim Ti is a member of the set of potential answers to a simple 
problem Si, or Ti  T, if and only if (1) P(PR(qi)  Ti) > P(PR(qi)) and (2) for all Tj 
[P(PR(qi) Ti & Tj)  P(PR(qi)  Tj )].26 
EXP is by no means especially novel and has been assumed to be a basic 
tenet of theories of explanation for some time. As was alluded to earlier, we should 
be aware here the epistemic imperative to bring it about that the agent knows that 
p used in the erotetic analysis of explanation will have to be weakened somewhat. 
In the context of why-questions and recognizing that explanation comes in 
degrees, it seems that we really need only know that a theoretical claim raises the 
probability of the phenomena or law in question and that there is no other 
theoretical claim that wholly accounts for this increase in probability in order for a 
theoretical claim to be counted as a potential explanation of some data or of some 
lower level theoretical claim 
Notice however that EXP does not narrow the range of explanations very 
much at all. As we noted and stressed earlier, it is well known that a non-finite 
number of theoretical claims can be arbitrarily constructed that satisfy EXP with 
respect to any problem Si simply by taking a theoretical claim Ti and disjoining it 
with arbitrary strings of expressions. This just tells us that the purely logical aspects 
                                                        
26 The second conjunct on the right hand side of the bi-conditional in EXP is included in order to 
rule out pseudo-explanations. See Alan Goldman, Empirical Knowledge (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1991). 
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of explanation are not very interesting and that they presuppose a sort of 
informational omniscience with respect to evidence and theory, and that we are 
forced by computational, cognitive and physical constraints to consider only those 
theoretical claims that we deem to be relevant from among those that have been 
explicitly formulated. In the unrestricted case T has the form {Ti  Tj  Tk  Tl . . 
.Tn}, while in real cases we only consider Tn of finite, and often quite small, 
cardinality and which hold only under idealizing assumptions. These more realistic 
cases of confirmation of competing theoretical claims are then often themselves 
cases of epistemic/methodological idealization where we are simplifying the 
confirmational context by reducing the number of theories that are being 
considered as serious candidates for confirmation by some given body of evidence 
that is itself restricted. As should then be obvious, the real substance of the account 
of theory acceptance developed here is to be found in B, the contextual factors that 
determine the epistemic standards in terms of which a given scientific problem is 
considered. In particular we must pay careful attention to those standards in 
addition to EXP that impact the ranking of explanations in given context. So, 
context determines which theoretical claims are taken to be relevant, what 
idealizing assumptions are allowed with respect to a given scientific problem and 
what factors will be used to rank explanations in addition to EXP. Context thereby 
determines Tn, en, I and the evidential and explanatory standards that characterize 
that explanatory scientific problem. 
2.5 The Contextual Aspects of Explanation 
Now we can focus our attention squarely on what might be the most interesting 
aspect of this account of IBE, its contextual aspects. More specifically, we can 
consider how epistemic context relates to epistemological standards operative in 
explanation. Finally, we can move on to consider in detail how we evaluate which 
explanation is best in a given context, and with this established we can formulate a 
general rule of theory acceptance based on those evaluative standards. 
So, what is an epistemic context? Answering this question is of central 
importance in explicating the sort of account of IBE offered here, and we can get 
some help from looking at epistemic contextualism. There are at least two forms of 
contextualism and we can follow DeRose’s terminology in order to locate the sort 
of contextualism appropriate to the sorts of explanatory endeavors in the physical 
sciences that we have been considering. Most crucially, DeRose distinguishes 
between subject contextualism and attributor contextualism.27 On the one hand, 
                                                        
27 See DeRose, “Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense.” 
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subject contextualists hold that features of the (physical) context of the subject of 
knowledge vary (e.g. location), and so whether the subject knows something or not 
depends on those contextual factors. Certainly environmental facts about 
computation and cognition can impact whether we know something or not. Also, 
facts about the environment in which we are located can impact whether we know 
certain things. When, for example, a subject inhabits an environment littered with 
fake barns or robot cats, we might say that he does not know that he sees a barn or 
a cat when she is the subject of particular sensory stimulations. When a type 
identical subject with type identical sensory experiences inhabits an environment 
that is relatively free from these sorts of deceptions, we might say that he does 
know that he sees a barn or a cat. On the other hand, attributor contextualism 
holds that contextual features of the conversational context of the attributor of 
knowledge to some other subject vary, and so whether we are warranted in saying 
of someone that they know varies with these contextual factors. What will vary in 
this sort of contextualism are the epistemic standards by which we judge of 
someone that they are warranted in making a knowledge attribution.28  
By and large, however, this distinction is superficial and it is not really 
necessary to opt exclusively for one or the other. This is simply because both kinds 
of contextual features are epistemically important. They are both essentially 
elements of what has typically been referred to as background knowledge. The 
former kinds of contextual factors are empirical facts about our cognitive 
limitations, computational capacities, physical environments, etc., and the latter 
kinds of contextual factors are pragmatic factors about how we are going to apply 
the term ‘explanation’ in light of our physical and epistemic situation. 
Furthermore, in a sense we are all both attributors and subjects of epistemic 
attributions, and being aware of one’s environmental context as well as being 
aware of one’s conversational context may make one’s own attributions of 
knowledge, or of justification, to othersor even to one’s selfdifferent. In any 
case, the kind of contextualism that characterizes explanatory situations involves 
both aspects of attributor contextualism and aspects of subject contextualism. The 
view developed here will be framed in terms of attributor contextualism as that 
view will allow us to subsume the kinds of factors that are of interest in subject 
contextualism. So, what we are interested in determining is when, in context B, an 
attributor a is justified in claiming of some subject b that b has explained e or Ti to 
some other agent c. In terms of the erotetic model of explanation outlined above, 
we are then ultimately interested in examining when in context B an attributor a is 
                                                        
28 See DeRose, The Case for Contextualism and David Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language 
Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979): 339-359. 
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justified in claiming of some subject b that b has provided an acceptable answer to 
a why-question about e or Ti to some other agent c. In other words, we want to 
know when b has met the imperative implicit in a scientific explanatory request, at 
least to some degree.  
2.6 Best Explanation and Problem Substitution in the Sciences 
So, now we can turn our attention to the issue of when are we justified in claiming 
of someone that they have provided the best answer to someone’s request for 
explanatory information in a given specific context? This is essentially the question 
of when in context B of an attributor a, b has explained e or Tj to c. Given this 
understanding of the erotetic model of explanation and our understanding of the 
contextual aspect of scientific explanation, we can claim that in context B a is 
justified in claiming of b that b has explained e (or has explained Ti) to c if and only 
if c has made a request ‘Why e?’ or ‘Why Ti?’ to b and b has conveyed to c that ‘Tj’ 
where Tj  T and Tj satisfies EXP. More importantly, we can now see that IBE can 
be presented in a similar manner. In context B, an attributor a is justified in 
claiming of some subject b that b has best explained e (or Ti) to c if and only if c has 
made the request ‘Why e?’ or ‘Why Ti?’ to b and b has conveyed to c that ‘Tj’ where 
Tj  T, Tj satisfies EXP, and Tj satisfies BEST. With respect to an ideal explanatory 
scientific problem involving T and a given body of evidence e, BEST is then 
characterized as follows: 
(BEST) If Tj satisfies EXP, then Tj is the best (purely logical) explanation of e in B 
if and only if ¬(Ti)[( Ti  T) & (P(e  Ti & B) > P(e  Tj & B))].29 
What defenders of IBE assert uniformly is that if this sort of principle is 
satisfied, then we are defeasibly warranted believing that Tj. In terms of the 
contextualist view of explanation presented here, what we are really allowed to say 
of a theory that satisfies BEST is that we are warranted in believing that Tj in 
                                                        
29 This is to be understood as a partial empirical analysis of the logical aspects of explanation in 
the sense articulated in Carl Hempel, Fundamental of Concept Formation in Empirical Science 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952). Also, in Lipton’s 2004 terminology, best or 
“loveliest” explanation is not being completely identified here with likeliest explanation. The 
conjecture about what explanation is best offered here is that it is the theory that is most highly 
ranked from among competitors based on the total set of criteria present in a given context. This 
is meant to stave off criticisms of (virtual) triviality that apply to stand-alone account of IBE 
based solely on criteria like BEST. See Christopher Hitchcock, “The Lovely and the Probable,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 433-440 for this criticism. See Peter 
Achenstein, Evidence and Method (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) for some additional 
criticisms of IBE. 
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context B. For our purposes here, notice that if we adopt BEST as a core component 
of a rule of theory acceptance, it allows us to assess the confirmational status of 
theories that are more or less realistic and it can easily be applied to cases where 
we are dealing with restricted sets of theories or restricted bodies of evidence.  
With respect to a more realistic explanatory scientific problem involving the 
restriction of theories considered to Tn and to a given body of evidence e, BEST can 
be modified to reflect this as follows: 
(BESTʹ) If Tj satisfies EXP, then Tj is the best (purely logical) explanation of e in B 
if and only if ¬(Ti)[( Ti  Tn) & (P(e  Ti & B) > P(e  Tj & B))]. 
This then means that we can still maintain a coherent and normative sense 
of inference to the best explanation with respect to both ideal and realistic 
contexts. In what follows we will primarily deal with BEST, and we will simply 
acknowledge at this point that BESTʹ can be substituted for BEST when dealing 
with more realistic cases of theory confirmation. Finally, one might then define 
the differential degree of confirmation of theoretical claim based on a measure of 
explanatory power as follows.30 With respect to an ideal explanatory scientific 
problem involving T, a given body of evidence e, and where Tj satisfies BEST and 
Ti is the second most likely theory relative to e,  
(CN) Cn(Ti) = diff[ P(e  Tj & B), P(e  Ti & B)].31 
So, on this particular view the differential degree of confirmation of a given 
best explanation is the degree to which it is more likely than the next most likely 
explanation of the same evidence.32 Of course this can be similarly defined for 
more realistic scientific problems by replacing BEST with BESTʹ. Real scientific 
problems then can be formally understood as follows: Si = <qi, Tn, eK, B, EXP, 
BESTʹ> . As we shall see, however, there is typically much more to rules of theory 
                                                        
30 This is but one possibility and is in no way a necessary component of the theory defended here.  
31 See Johnah Schupbach, “Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power,” Philosophy 
of Science 78 (2011): 813-829 and Jonah Schupbach and Jan Sprenger, “The Logic of Explanatory 
Power,” Philosophy of Science 78 (2011): 105-127 for discussion of other measures of 
explanatory power. 
32 There may also be other measures of the degree of confirmation or evidential support, but this 
one seems reasonable and (importantly) it is suitably differential. See Edward Erwin and Harvey 
Siegel “Is Confirmation Differential?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1989): 
105-119 for discussion of the differentiality of inference to the best explanation. One related 
alternative that looks similarly promising has been articulated by Kyburg and Teng (Uncertain 
Inference, 103). It is derived from the work in John Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim, “Degree of 
Factual Support,” Philosophy of Science 19 (1952): 307-324. This differential measure can be 
stated as follows: Cn*(Tie) = P(e  Ti) - P(e  Ti) / P(e  Ti) + P(e  Ti). 
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acceptance at work in given contexts than EXP and BEST and this is part of the 
background knowledge present in such cases. But, more importantly, why should 
we regard this sort of inferential scheme as probative? If we cannot justify the 
probative nature of this account, then we are not entitled to hold that such 
inferences have normative force. So, why is inference to the best explanation a 
probative form of inference? 
2.7 The Probative Nature of IBE 
Many philosophers have raised objections with respect to IBE for a variety of 
reasons, but they have typically done so without explicitly acknowledging that IBE 
is nonmonotonic, that it is dynamic, and that such inferences often depend on 
simplifying assumptions with respect to the evidence entertained and the theories 
considered in those inferences. With respect to this latter feature, it is crucial to 
understand that typical cases of IBE are normative and depend (at least) on three 
simplifying assumptions. The first assumption is that scientists consider only a 
finite set of relevant theoretical claims when assessing what is the best explanation 
of some phenomenon or lower level theoretical claim.33 Second scientists consider 
only a subset of the total known evidence relevant to a scientific explanatory 
problem. Thirdly, scientists typically deal with theoretical claims that hold only 
under one or more idealizing assumption. As we shall see, all of these assumptions 
are fixed by contextual factors.  
That said, the standard and supposedly damning criticism of IBE in the 
literature is, of course, due to van Fraassen. The primary worry that he infamously 
raised about inference to the best explanation concerns the idea that we have no 
good reason to accept the best explanation of some phenomenon from among a 
finite set of actually formulated theoretical claims unless we have reason to believe 
that the true explanation is a member of the set we are considering. Of course, van 
Fraassen claims that we only ever deal with very small sets of such theoretical 
claims when those sets are compared to the set of logically possible, but 
unformulated, theoretical claims. So, van Fraassen concludes that IBE is not 
probative because it is more likely that we are accepting the best of a bad lot, and if 
we are just accepting the best of a bad lot then IBE does not track the truth. In 
other words, as he sees it, it is irrational to accept the conclusion of any actual IBE 
as likely to be true. Van Fraassen entertains three potential types of responses to 
this line of argument and he refers to these three general strategies as follows: the 
privilege strategy, the force majeure strategy and the retrenchment strategy. 
                                                        
33See especially van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry. 
Michael J. Shaffer  
426 
The privilege response essentially involves the idea that we have some 
special ability to track the truth and so are entitled to believe that the true theory 
is among those we consider in inferring the best explanation from sets of known 
theories. As van Fraassen puts it, the privilege strategy depends on the dubious 
assumption that “…we are predisposed to hit on the right range of hypotheses.”34 
The privilege response takes both naturalistic and rationalistic forms, but neither is 
at all compelling. There is simply no good reason to believe that the set of known 
hypotheses we deal with must contain the truth. The force majeure response 
involves the basic idea that we simply have no alternative and so must infer the 
best explanation from among the relevant set of known alternatives. But, van 
Fraassen rejects this response because forced choices are not necessarily rational 
choices. So, from the fact that we must infer the nest explanation from among 
known explanations it does not follow that the best alternative is true. The 
retrenchment response involves rejecting inference to the best explanation and 
replacing it with an alternative account of theory acceptance. So, ultimately, he 
claims we are not entitled to believe in the truth of our best explanations and that 
we should engage in radical retrenchment in epistemology. In doing so, he rejects 
the appeal mysterious powers, and he is right to do so. However, his argument 
against the probativity of IBE is flawed and his negative assessment of the 
probativity of IBE is over-stated. The contention made here is that this is the case 
because his argument against IBE is based on an uncharitable understanding of the 
actual practice of inferring best explanations as it is done in actual practice.35 The 
defense against van Fraassen’s argument mounted here is then best understood as a 
sophisticated version of the force majure response, and we shall see that it is one 
that enjoys considerable support from the HBP as well as the BER program. 
The sense in which IBE is probative needs to account for the idea that IBE is 
nonmonotonic and that in inference to the best explanation we deal with 
incomplete information (i.e. evidence) and incomplete sets of explanatory 
theories.36 In accord with these ideas, the appropriate notion of “goodness” for IBE 
is nonmonotonic and is a form of ideal case reasoning. What we are entitled to 
                                                        
34 van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry, 143. 
35 Specifically, it involves all the elements of abductive search as understood in Hintikka, “What 
is Abduction.” 
36 So, in his “Is the Bad Lot Objection Just Misguided?” Schupbach is correct to note that van 
Fraassen simply misses the point when he criticizes IBE as a probative form of inference in 
criticizing the quality of the inputs to which IBEs are applied. When coupled with Hintikka’s 
understanding of the dynamic nature of abductive search from his “What is Abduction?” all of 
van Fraassen’s worries go away. IBEs are simply inferences made in dynamic contexts where we 
are constantly updating the sets of hypotheses and bodies of evidence to which IBEs are applied. 
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assert when we use IBE is that in worlds that are more epistemically perfect than 
but still similar to the actual world, it is the case that (at least) one of the 
theoretical claims in T is more likely to be true than the others. The sense in which 
these worlds are ideal or perfect is that in such worlds we know of all the 
alternative theories, we know all the relevant evidence and we are able to assess 
those theories in terms of BEST (and whatever other norms are in place in a given 
context). Since that ideal case claim is true with respect to ideal worlds, we should 
employ IBE in actual practice and so it is an appropriate norm with respect to real 
world science. This is a sort of Kantian approach to normativity and it is based on 
the following sort of argument.37 A fully rational scientist would select the best 
explanation from among all possible alternatives on the basis of all evidence. If a 
fully rational scientist would select the best explanation from among all possible 
alternatives on the basis of all evidence, then an imperfectly rational scientist 
ought to select the best explanation from among all possible alternatives on the 
basis of all evidence. Therefore, an imperfectly rational scientist ought to select the 
best explanation from among all possible alternatives on the basis of all evidence. 
Actual scientists are, of course, imperfectly rational. Therefore, actual scientists 
ought to select the best explanation from among all possible alternatives on the 
basis of all evidence. But, we can only be reasonably expected to obey norms to the 
degree that we can actually do so. So, we can further reason as follows. If actual 
scientists ought to select the best explanation from among all possible alternatives 
on the basis of all evidence but they are not capable of doing this at time t, then 
actual scientists ought only to do their best to select the best explanation from 
among all possible alternatives on the basis of all evidence at time t. Therefore, 
actual scientists ought only to do their best to select the best explanation from 
among all possible alternatives on the basis of all evidence at time t. So, the best 
actual scientists can hope to achieve in any given context at a given time is to select 
the best explanation of a phenomenon from among known hypothesis on the basis 
of known evidence. That is typically the best that we can do in our imperfect 
circumstances. We are limited beings in environments that constrain our abilities 
to reason and so we must often substitute more easily solvable problems for those 
that are beyond our abilities in a given context. 
So, the purely probabilistic rule BEST (in conjunction with any additional 
norms in our background knowledge) tells us how to evaluate theories on the basis 
                                                        
37 The argument presented here depends heavily on the interpretation of Kant from Robert 
Holmes, Basic Moral Theory, 4th ed. (New York: Cengage, 2006). See Michael Shaffer, “Bealer on 
the Autonomy of Philosophical and Scientific Knowledge,” Metaphilosophy 38 (2007): 44-54 for 
discussion of ideal case counterfactuals. 
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of evidence in such situations, and in such cases we are warranted in accepting the 
theoretical claim that maximizes likelihood even if we do not actually meet the 
preconditions of the ideal case claim. We can be governed by the ideal norm and 
yet also be warranted in following its real world correlate because we cannot do 
any better. The normatively correct acceptance of theories in real world contexts 
then amounts to our being warranted in accepting the best of a known lot of 
hypothesis on the basis of known evidence in a given context. In other words, it is 
rational for us to employ the availability heuristic. In such cases we are entitled to 
accept the theory that maximizes likelihood from among known theories on the 
basis of known evidence, at least pending the introduction of more evidence, or 
the introduction of new theoretical claims, or other changes in context. In essence, 
we must settle and accept that if the restricted set of theoretical claims were the set 
of all possible theoretical claims and the evidence of which we are aware were all 
of the evidence, then we would be entitled to accept that theoretical claim which 
maximizes likelihood on that evidence as true in that context. What else could we 
do in such a situation? In fact, to claim that IBE of this sort is irrational would 
commit us to wholesale skepticism about explanation and about science and it 
would be totally at odds with actual practice. The history of scientific practice just 
is the history of explaining to the degree that we currently are able and so problem 
substitution is the bread and butter of explanatory science. We seek to solve 
simpler explanatory problems first and then attempt to deal with their more 
complex incarnations.  
However, it is clear that in typical scientific contexts there are more norms 
at work than just BEST. Since we do science in the actual world and not in 
normatively perfect worlds, we also have to do our best to close the gap between 
the actual world and the normatively ideal world. Properly conducted science 
typically requires us to attempt to gather more evidence, to generate new and 
better evidence using new methods, and so on. It also typically requires us to 
formulate and consider new competing hypotheses. As such, science is typically 
conducted under the assumption of the following two additional norms, the norm 
of evidential generation and the norm of theoretical innovation: 
(EVG) We should gather and generate evidence using the best means available. 
(THI) We should formulate and consider hypotheses.38 
                                                        
38 These norms are part of the more broad process of abductive search as understood in Hintikka, 
“What is Abduction” and IBE can them be understood as the terminal and inferential stage of 
such abductive inquiry. 
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These are then norms of bias correction that allow us to alleviate worries 
about the kinds of biases that can arise from the kind of problem substitution that 
the availability heuristic involves. EVG and THI then allow us to offer an answer 
to van Fraassen’s worries about IBE based on the nonmonotonic and dynamic 
practice of inferring explanations on the basis evidence. Dynamic and contextual 
IBE is a defeasible but probative form of inference that says that we should always 
accept the best available explanation of the available evidence in a given context, 
but that is by no means the end of the story at all. We should also strive to satisfy 
EVG and THI so that we come closer to satisfying the ideal case norm by 
correcting biases over time. So, while it is true that in some context at some time 
we may be accepting the best of a bad lot this need not be true in the long run. 
From the fact that actual conditions are not normatively perfect, it does not follow 
that it IBE is irrational and it does not follow that it does not track the truth in the 
long run. In effect, what we can see is that real scientific problems are dynamic in 
nature. So, real dynamic scientific problems are sequences of problems with the 
following form: Si = <qi, Tn, eK, B, EXP, BESTʹ, EVG, THI>. They are instances of 
the application of problem substitution involving the availability heuristic to ideal 
problems of the form: Si = <Qn, T, E, B, EXP, BEST>. Given EVG and THI such 
sequences of Sis will involve sets Tn and eK that are being expanded sequentially as 
we become aware of new evidence and new theories in our search for the truth. 
Typical, environmentally situated, members of such sequences will be simplified 
version of a complete and far more complex problem. But, solving the simpler 
problems very often yields insight into the answers to those complete problems. 
The simpler explanation provide partial understanding of the very same 
phenomena that the more complex explanations more fully explain. There are 
however some other aspects of this theory of explanation that are in need of a bit 
more detailed discussion, especially as they pertain to the robust evaluation of 
what theory is the best explanation in a given context.  
2.8 The Variety of Explanatory Practices 
As stressed at the beginning of this paper what is then important to recognize is 
that given this very general account of explanation, we can account for the variety 
of explanatory practices in the various sciences and their respective sub-fields in 
terms of the different additional methodological norms that are elements of the 
contexts that characterize those disciplines. So, the standards required for the 
confirmation of the existence of a particle in high-energy physics may be very 
high, this need not be true for the confirmation of a claim that a patient has a 
particular psychological disorder in clinical psychology. Moreover, some scientific 
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contexts may require that acceptable explanations are causal/mechanical, while 
others may require only statistical models. Some contexts may allow black box 
explanations, while others may not. Similarly, in some scientific contexts that 
characterize problems in physics or chemistry general laws may be required to 
explain, whereas in others such as biology or archaeology only singular causal 
explanations may be required to explain. Finally, we may find that more general 
methodological norms like simplicity, predictive novelty, conservativeness and so 
on characterize scientific practice in different contexts. What is of great 
importance is that we recognize that his aspect of the contextual theory of IBE is 
an asset as opposed to a problem. This is because, while the theory developed here 
ties explanation to understanding in a minimal and partial way via EXP and BEST 
and thereby unifies explanatory practice in a normative way at a very generic 
level, it is compatible with the observed variety of explanatory practices in the 
sciences and the variety of additional methodological norms that characterize 
individual contexts. This means then that BEST is not a full account of IBE. It is 
merely a core part of the theory of what counts as the best explanation in a given 
context and this rule can be supplemented with all sorts of additional criteria that 
might be elements of our background knowledge. How these additional features 
count in ranking hypothesis beyond the ranking imposed on the set of potential 
answers to a given scientific problem will itself be a function of the background 
knowledge present in the context of that explanatory problem. This then further 
suggests that there are different epistemically virtuous senses of understanding as 
well that correspond to the satisfaction of different sets of scientific and 
methodological desiderata and also that there are different degrees of explanatory 
understanding. So, as suggested earlier, this view is particularly well suited to the 
naturalistic studies of the sciences and the study of the diversity of methodological 
practices that we find therein. With respect to the theory developed here, what 
this amounts to is just the idea that we cannot really assess the confirmational 
status of theoretical claims absent some serious understanding of the 
methodological features of actual scientific contexts. Nevertheless, once we have 
established the details of a given context the confirmational status of a given 
theory can be assessed in terms of EXP, BEST and whatever additional norms 
happen to characterize that context. 
3. Rational Heuristics, Ecological Rationality and Explanatory Contextualism 
What is then worth emphasizing here is that, from the perspective of the 
voluminous literature on the psychology of human reasoning, the quasi-formal and 
philosophical view of explanation developed in this paper enjoys considerable 
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empirical support. This is secured via its natural relationship to the expansive body 
of work on fast and frugal reasoning heuristics for problem solving and some of its 
close relatives, including the BER. In particular the work of Gerd Gigerenzer and 
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky are of special importance here.39 
As noted throughout this discussion, one core idea behind the concepts of the HBP 
and of BER is that real agents do not have unlimited computational capacities, 
time, complete information, etc. and that the heuristic rules of inference and 
decision-making that real agents use are normatively appropriate only relative to 
specific environments for which they have been evolutionarily developed. The 
idea then is that we need to explore the manner in which real inferences and 
decisions are made by actual cognizers in order to see how it is that such reasoning 
is done quickly and frugally based on our actual abilities. The second core idea 
relevant here is the concept of ecological rationality. The idea here is that real 
reasoning is not the result of a generic, domain-independent, capacity to deliberate 
and reason in accordance with some universal rules of rationality cashed out in 
terms of informational omniscience. As a result, the heuristics for reasoning and 
decision-making advocated by this approach are the results of and work only in the 
specific environments in which they are generated, presumably by evolutionary 
adaptation.  
What is then important for the purposes of this paper is that the formal 
model of explanation developed here is readily compatible with this more general 
and realistic model of reasoning and decision-making. This is primarily because of 
two reasons. First, inferring best explanations from known sets of hypotheses and 
data can be understood to be a normative heuristic guided process that reflects our 
finite epistemic abilities. It crucially involves problem substitution and the 
availability heuristic. The availability heuristic is an epistemic norm that we ought 
to follow, but, more importantly, it is one which we can follow. It is normative in 
the short run in the sense that the best available explanation of the available 
evidence is the most likely explanation from that set. It is normative in the long 
run in the sense that we ought to continue to gather new and better evidence and 
to formulate new and better theories in order to combat the kinds of biases that the 
availability heuristic can introduce in its short run applications. So, the dynamic 
aspects of the account allow for the idea that such inferences are normative but 
revisable in light of newly acquired evidence and newly formulated theories. The 
process of explanatory reasoning is dynamically rational in the nonmonotonic 
sense. Second, the central role that contextuality plays in the account of IBE 
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developed here is simply a way of formally representing the ecological aspects of 
real-world reasoning. We infer best explanations in real contexts governed by a 
variety of constraints that are the result of our epistemic finitude, our real 
environments and our background knowledge. So, explanatory contextualism is 
usefully be understood to be a formal analog of the ecological facts that constrain 
actual human reasoning that motivate problem substitution. Facts about our 
abilities and the environments we inhabit constrain us in the process of abductive 
search in general and specifically in the ultimate stage of such inquiry, IBE. It is 
virtually platitudinous to assert that we can only reason in terms of what is 
psychologically available to us given our computational abilities. But, we can 
ultimately be successful in explaining and understanding the world when we 
realize that IBE is also dynamic. Having the best explanation of some phenomenon 
in one simplified context is by no means the end of abductive inquiry. The 
employment of the availability heuristic opens the door to bias and 
incompleteness, but such biases and lacuna are correctable because reasoning is 
dynamic and problem contexts change over time. This allows us to search for 
deeper and more complex explanations as context changes and we are able to 
contend with greater complexity or become aware of new theories and evidence. 
4. Conclusion: Dynamic Contextual IBE and Abductive Search for the Truth 
So, by taking the HBP and BER conception of rationality seriouslyspecifically by 
appeal to the availability heuristic and the more general notion of problem 
substitutionwe can see that IBE, the terminal inferential stage of abductive 
search, is rationally grounded. Moreover, this approach to IBE allows for a more 
sophisticated understanding of IBE as a dynamic and contextual sort of reasoning 
that functions in the context of the search for explanations. So understood IBE can 
be defended against van Fraassen’s “best of a bad lot” objection to IBE and, 
contrary to van Fraassen’s claims, it is rational to accept the conclusions of IBEs 
even if we are not in possession of the total set of logically possible explanatory 
theories of some body of evidence. But, IBE is not a static kind of inference and it 
yields provisionally true conclusions that hold relative to the context in which 
they are made, but context can change and so the specific standards used to judge 
bestness of explanations, the set of theories considered and the body of evidence 
explained can change. All of this reflects actual explanatory practice in the sciences 
much more accurately than does the static view of IBE. 
